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RECENT CASES
Criminal Law-Psychological Coercion of Confessions in State Courts
During the course of a criminal trial in a state court the confession
of the defendant was admitted and the jury was instructed to deter-
mine its voluntary character. The confession was obtained by a num-
ber of officers who questioned the defendant for a total of twelve hours
stretched out over a thirty-two hour period, during which period the
suspect was permitted to eat and sleep. The defendant was held in-
communicado over sixty-four hours before arraignment. In return
for his confession the defendant was able to negotiate with the officers
for the release of his father who was arrested at the same time, and was
promised that his brother would not be prosecuted for a parole viola-
tion. The jury was instructed that the confession was valid if volun-
tary, but if they found that coercion had been used to obtain the con-
fession, they were not to consider it, but.instead, make their determina
tipn of guilt on the other evidence admitted at the trial. Held: con-
viction affirmed.1
The trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, the trial of William Otis, and the
germ warfare confessions of American soldiers in Korea, prove that a
confession may be extorted by mental punishment just as readily as
by physical torture. One of the difficult problems in the field of
psychological coercion is the determination of what test is to be ap-
plied to determine whether the confession is voluntary. Different
courts have used different terms to test the admissibility of a confes-
sion, such as "forced," "coerced," "involuntary," and "loss of fredom of
w ill.,2
Because of apparently contradictory United States Supreme Court
decisions3 and the large number of dissenting opinions in this field,4
'Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953).
-Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 159 (1944).
'Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 184 (1951) (Conviction affirmed. De-
fendant was threatened by arresting officer, and refused counsel before con-
fession which was obtained four hours after arrest.); Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55 (1951) (Conviction affirmed. Defendant, an illiterate Mexican,
was held twenty-five days after arrest before being brought before magistrate,
twenty-seven days before counsel assigned, and was told that he might be
turned over to Mexican authorities for more severe questioning.); Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1948) (Conviction reversed. Defendant, an
illiterate Negro, was held incommunicado five days, was not informed of
charges against him or of his rights, was questioned day and nigh't by a relay
of officers, was confined in a small, hot room and was told his mother would
be arrested if he did not confess.); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1948)
(Conviction reversed. Defendant was held incommunicado five days before
arraignment, was not advised of his constitutional right to remain silent, was
interrogated by a relay of officers day and night, and was falsely told other
suspects had informed on him.); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1948) (Con-
viction reversed. Defendant was held incommunicado six days without ar-
raignment, was kept in solitary confinement for six days, was permitted small
amounts of sleep and food, and was interrogated by relays of officers five out
of six nights from evening till after midnight and intermittently at other
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it is impossible to lay down any formula which expresses the view of
the Supreme Court,5 but there are certain factors which the court uses
to evaluate whether a confession was voluntary or not: (1) number of
questioners;6 (2) health, age, education, and race of the defendant; (3)
time held incommunicado; (4) delay before arraignment;7 (5) length of
questioning,s deprivation of refreshment, rest or relief during ques-
tioning; 9 (6) threats or promises of benefit made; (7) hostility of ques-
tioners; (8) defendant's experience in ways of crime;10 and (9) living
conditions during retention.
It is impossible to tell what factors the court will decide are im-
portant in a particular case; however any review by the Supreme Court
must be undertaken on the basis of uncontrovertible facts."
times in the day and night.); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1947) (Convictiqn
reversed. Defendant, a fifteen year old boy, was arrested at midnight and
grilled by a relay of officers until 5:00 a.m., was held incommunicado for three
days, was denied the right to consult with his mother and counsel, although
photographers were permitted to see the boy.); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1944) (Conviction reversed. Defendant was held incommunicado for four
days, was stripped and kept naked from 8 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and was given
only a blanket in which to wrap himself until 6:00 p.m. when he finally con-
fessed. He was retained in custody and intermittenly questioned for three
additional days. A second confession was given on the fourth day after nine
hours of questioning.); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (Conviction
reversed. Defendant, formerly a citizen of excellent reputation, was held
incommunicado thirty-six hours, denied rest during this time, and was inter-
rogated by a relay of officers using a spotlight.); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596 (1943) (Conviction affirmed. Defendant was not supplied with counsel
for sixteen days after arrest, was questioned at one time for twenty-six to
twenty-eight hours by a relay of officials; also, a pan of the victims bones were
placed in his lap by his interrogators, first confession admittedly was coerced,
he confessed again twelve hours later.); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)
(Conviction reversed. Defendant, an illiterate Negro, was driven from county
to county for three days being questioned continuously, was placed in jail
more than 100 miles from his home, was slapped once by a constable, and
was told of possible mob violence.); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)
(Conviction affirmed. Defendant, a man of intelligence and business experi-
ence, was questioned for forty-eight hours, was slapped once, was held three
days before arraignment, and was denied the right of counsel.); Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1940) (Conviction reversed without opinion.); Lomax
v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1940) (Conviction reversed without opinion.); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (Conviction reversed. Defendant, an illiterate
farmhand, was held six days before confession, without counsel, without
charges filed against him, and incommunicado. It was admitted that he was
questioned in the woods because the jail was crowded.); Canty v. Alabama,
309 U.S. 629 (1940) (Conviction reversed without opinion.); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (Conviction reversed. Defendant, an uneducated
Negro, was arrested as one of forty suspects, was interrogated by relay of
officers for five days and nights, and was held incommunicado for eight days.).
'In the seventeen cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1939, on ap-
peal from state courts, ten were decided by a divided court, five being affirmed
and five being reversed. See notes 1 and 3 supra. It is interesting to note
that three of the five cases affirmed were the most recent to appear before
the court, possibly indicating a trend.
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The following table shows how the justices have voted on the issue.
- R A R A
Present Supreme Court Members:
B lack ...................................................................... 17 0 10 0
Douglas ............................... 16 1 9 1
B urton ............................................. ...................... 3 4 2 4
R eed ....... ........................... ............................. 10 7 3 7
Frankfurter .......................................................... 12 5 5 5
W arren ................................................................. 0 0 0 0
M inton ................... ....... ................................. 0 2 0 2
C lark ................................................................... 0 3 0 3
Jackson ................................................................ 2 10 0 10
Past Supreme Court Members:
R utledge ........................... .... .......................... 7 0 6 0
M urphy ....... ...................... .............................. 12 1 6 1
V inson ................................................................... 3 4 2 4
R ob erts ............................................................... 6 4 0 4
S ton e .................................... ............................... 7 3 0 3
B ryn es .................................................................. 1 1 0 1
H ughes .................................................................. 4 0 0 0
M cR eynolds .......................................................... 3 0 0 0
The table considers all seventeen cases as well as the ten on which the
court was divided. Column R represents the number of times the justice
voted for reversal and column A the number of times the justice voted for
affirmation. The two columns to the left represent an analysis of all the
seventeen cases, and the two columns on the right analyze the ten cases on
which the court split.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1947) (Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter: 'The answer [whether voluntary or not] . . . depends on an
evaluation of psychological factors, or, more accurately stated, upon the
persuasive feling of society regarding such psychological factors. Unfortunately
we cannot draw upon any formulated expression of the existence of such feel-
ing. Nor are there available experts on such matters to guide the judicial
judgment. Our Constitutional system makes it the Court's duty to interpret
those feelings of society to which the Due Process Clause gives legal protection.
Because of their inherent vagueness the tests by which we are guided are most
unsatisfactory, but such as they are we must apply them.").
6 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1093 (1953) ("While we have re-
versed convictions founded on confessions secured through interrogation by
'relays,' we have also sustained convictions when, under different circumstances,
the relay technique was employed."). Cases are cited in footnote of this case.
I Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1094 (1953) ("To delay arraignment,
meanwhile holding the suspect incommunicado, facilitates and usually ac-
companies use of 'third-degree' methods. Therefore, we regard such oc-
currences as relevant circumstantial evidence in the inquiry as to physical or
psychological coercion.").
1 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Justice Jackson dissenting:
"Interrogation per se is not, while violence, per se is, an outlaw. Questioning
is an indisputable instrumentality of Justice.").
I Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1092 (1953) ("Of course, a process
of interrogation can be so prolonged and unremitting, especially when accom-
panied by deprivation of refreshment, rest, or relief, as to accomplish extor-
tion of an involuntary confession.").
l GStein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1093 (1953) ("The limits in any case
depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power
of resistance of the person confessing. What would be overpowering to the
weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced
criminal.").
11 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944).
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It is essential to a clear understanding of this problem that a dis-
tinction be drawn between psychological coercion and mere persua-
sion in police force methods. The distinction, although a matter of
degree, is necessary because the use of persuasion is fundamental to
proper law enforcement. Persuasion is the process of convincing an
accused that he should tell the truth without violating that funda-
mental fairness essential to the very concept of justice during the
process. One of the most frequent methods of persuasion used today
is the offer made to the accused to submit to a lie detector test to prove
his innocence. If the accused is told its use is entirely optional, there
is no psychological coercion if he confesses prior to or after subjection
to the lie detector test, unless, of course, the accused is under the im-
pression that the machine will physically harm him.
Prior to the instant case, which arose in New York, it was commonly
understood that the admission of an involuntary confession was
sufficient grounds for reversal.12 As a result of the principal case, it
might be that on appeal it would also be necessary to prove that aside
from the confession there was not sufficient evidence to affirm the
conviction.13 The procedure used in New York presents numerous
practical problems since it is impossible to ascertain whether or not
some of the jurors based their verdict on the confession; also, the con-
fession might influence the jury's determination of other facts.
In Nebraska the question of whether or not a confession should be
admitted is one of law for the court, and if the court determines as a
matter of law that no sufficient foundation has been laid, then the con-
fession is rejected. However, where the confession is received in
evidence, its voluntary character is still a question of fact to be
determined by the jury. 4
12 For those who follow personalities on the Supreme Court bench, it is in-
teresting to note that Mr. Justice Jackson who has one of the most consistent
voting records on the Supreme Court wrote the majority opinion for the
principal case. See note 5 supra.11 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1944) ("And if it is introduced
at the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the
evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the
jury's verdict."). For similar statements see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1951); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596 (1943). In the instant case at page 1095 Mr. Justice Jackson states "That
these statements [the above quote from the Malinski case] were dicta about
a proposition not essential to the result, since in each instance those confessions
were sustained and the convictions affirmed." This is a true statement by Mr.
Justice Jackson, but even he had to admit it was not so in the Malinski case
where the conviction was reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas in the instant case at
page 1104 also states "And with respect to the Malinski case, it should be noted
that, despite a dissent by four Justices, no one took exeption to the rule that
the use of a coerced confession violates due process."
1' Kitts v. State, 151 Neb. 679, 39 N.W.2d 283 (1949).

